America\u27s Banking System: The Origins and Future of the Current Crisis by Macey, Jonathan R. & Miller, Geoffrey P.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 69 
Issue 3 Symposium on Banking Reform 
1991 
America's Banking System: The Origins and Future of the Current 
Crisis 
Jonathan R. Macey 
Cornell University 
Geoffrey P. Miller 
New York University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, America's Banking System: The Origins and Future of the 
Current Crisis, 69 WASH. U. L. Q. 769 (1991). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/5 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
AMERICA'S BANKING SYSTEM: THE ORIGINS
AND FUTURE OF THE CURRENT CRISIS
JONATHAN R. MACEY AND GEOFFREY P. MILLER*
INTRODUCTION
Between 1945 and 1980, bank failures in the United States averaged
fewer than five per year. Since 1980, however, U.S. commercial banks
have failed at an average rate of over 100 per year, many of our largest
and best known banks have encountered serious financial difficulties, and
talk of a banking "crisis" has become increasingly prevalent. Politicians,
pundits, and academics have come forward with many clever explana-
tions for the crisis and proposals to cure it.
Blame has been variously assigned to government policy, such as the
banking regulations of the 1930s or the banking deregulation of the
1970s; to economic developments such as moribund real estate markets,
oil price volatility, and opportunistic third world debtors; and to business
misjudgments on the part of bankers themselves. None of these explana-
tions is entirely convincing because none satisfactorily answers the cru-
cial question: "Why now?" Virtually all of the explanations, for
example, point to federally subsidized deposit insurance as an essential
cause of the current crisis. Yet the federal government has been subsi-
dizing deposit insurance since 1933. One must ask why the adverse se-
lection and perverse incentive problems that characterize subsidized risk
taking are only now beginning to manifest themselves.
What is lacking in the current policy debate is an explanation of why
U.S. commercial banks and thrift institutions, which flourished for four
decades under restrictive government regulatory policies, suddenly began
to fail in massive numbers in the 1980s-in the midst of the most pro-
longed economic expansion in modern American history. Until we un-
derstand why banks are failing now, we will not be able to evaluate the
various reform proposals circulating like so many birds of prey over what
was, until recently, the greatest banking system in the world.
* Jonathan R. Macey is J. DuPratt White Professor of Law at Cornell University, and Geof-
frey P. Miller is Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. The authors wish
to thank Christopher DeMuth, William S. Haraf, and Michael Klausner for useful suggestions and
advice. David Greenwald, class of 1993 at the University of Chicago Law School, and Robert G.
Wray, class of 1993 at Cornell Law School provided valuable research assistance.
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This Article explains why contraction of commercial banking-as de-
fined, organized, and conducted under federal supervision since the
1930s-is inevitable over time. We show how technological innovation
and improvements in the primary and secondary trading markets for fi-
nancial products have led to an irreversible decline in the demand for the
services commercial banks are permitted to offer. We then show why the
Bush Administration's reform proposals, although dramatic, far-reach-
ing, and, in certain important respects highly constructive, ultimately
will not solve the bank failure problem resulting from these economic
trends. We also explain what further changes must be made to correct
the now-endemic problems that plague the U.S. banking industry.
I. THE ROLE OF BANKS IN ECONOMIC THEORY
In a world of perfect information and "zero transaction costs," there
would be no banks. Capital would flow directly from perfectly informed
investors to those who could put it to use at the risk-return trade-off the
investors preferred. Should investors' preferences for savings and invest-
ment over current consumption change, they could sell the income
stream associated with their investments directly to other investors with-
out incurring transaction costs such as the cost of locating those inves-
tors and contracting with them. In other words, in a world in which
information and market transactions were costless, there would be no
need for financial intermediaries of any kind. Needless to say, we do not
live in such a world.
Instead, we live in a world in which reliable information about the
future cash flows associated with financial assets is quite costly to obtain
and verify. In our imperfect world, assets, even valuable assets, are often
highly illiquid and difficult to value. These valuation and liquidity
problems create obstacles for savers and investors who want to obtain the
benefits of diversification and who make consumption decisions at differ-
ent times. In such a world, commercial banks and other financial in-
termediaries have an important role to play in the economy for several
reasons. '
First, banks specialize in assessing credit risk. Banks, at least in the-
ory, accumulate money from investors (depositors) on the basis of their
ability to identify good, profitable uses for depositors' funds. Depositors
1. This discussion draws on material from chapter one of the authors' forthcoming book,
Banking Law and Regulation: Cases and Materials (Little, Brown & Co. 1992).
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are willing to pay for the benefit of banks' financial skills because few
individual investors are able to distinguish good loans from bad. By
placing their money in a bank, depositors in effect hire the bank to use its
know-how in identifying good investment opportunities. The beauty of a
properly functioning banking system is that depositors need not-in fact
almost never do-know anything about the markets in which the bank
invests its assets. Because they need not gain the expertise themselves,
the depositors can spend their time doing the things they enjoy.
Second, banks allow depositors to take advantage of economies of scale
that otherwise would place many good investment opportunities out of
the grasp of ordinary investors. Commercial bank loans often are made
to borrowers who need millions of dollars in capital. Most investors are
unable to extend this kind of credit, particularly if they want to retain the
benefits of a diversified investment portfolio. Because banks pool funds
from numerous depositors, the depositors are able to participate in the
market for large-scale investments.
Third, banks convert illiquid investments into what are, from the de-
positors' perspective, liquid investments.2 A liquid investment is one that
the investor can convert to cash quickly in order to meet sudden de-
mands for funds. All else being equal, of course, investors would prefer
to hold liquid investments rather than illiquid ones. Consequently, bor-
rowers forced to offer potential investors illiquid investments must offer
such investors a greater return to compensate them for the additional
inconvenience of illiquidity. Banks, by issuing demand deposits, "can
improve on a competitive market by providing better risk sharing among
people who need to consume at different random times."3
Thus, banks improve the operation of the economy by investing in
portfolios of illiquid assets and by offering depositors liquid claims (de-
posits) on the banks' own assets. This conversion of illiquid investments
into liquid ones provides a significant benefit for investors-and for bor-
rowers as well. Consider a manufacturing firm with an asset that cannot
be used to pay current operating expenses because it is not generating
any income at present. Suppose further that the future income that will
be generated by this asset is uncertain and difficult to value. This asset is
2. Diamond and Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401,
403 (1983) ("Banks are able to transform illiquid assets (into liquid assets) by offering liabilities with
a different, smoother pattern of returns.... Iliquidity of assets provides the rationale... for the
existence of banks..
3. Id. at 402.
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illiquid. If, however, the firm can obtain a loan from a bank secured by
the asset, it can convert a substantial portion of the asset's value into
liquid form while continuing to control the plant.
Banks' ability to sell their skill at valuing assets, their ability to allow
investors and borrowers to realize economies of scale in investing, and
their ability to convert illiquid investments into liquid investments all
explain why banks have survived and prospered even though financial
intermediation is costly both to lenders (depositors) and to borrowers.
This is a succinct description of the role that banks play in the econ-
omy. Notice, however, that because the demand for banks' services
arises from imperfect information and from the costliness of arranging
direct investor-borrower transactions, the demand for these services will
decline as markets develop-and in particular as the costs of organizing
and communicating information and arranging financial transactions
fall. First, as markets develop, intermediaries other than commercial
banks will emerge to provide funds to particularly large borrowers, and
banks will cease to be unique in this respect. Life insurance companies,
for example, receive funds from purchasers of insurance that they invest
in securities, loans, and other productive assets. While insurance compa-
nies can "purchase" funds on significantly different terms than banks,
they amass substantial resources that allow them to make large-scale in-
vestments of the kind banks make. Pension funds can do likewise.4
Open-end mutual funds, which accept investments from customers and
invest these funds in securities, compete even more directly with banks
by allowing investors to redeem their shares at any time, and by allowing
investors to make redemptions by writing checks to third parties drawn
on their mutual fund accounts. Thus, investors now have many mecha-
nisms for pooling their funds with those of other investors to overcome
the economies of scale problems described above. As these alternative
avenues of financial intermediation emerge, it is only natural that the
relative importance of banks as financial intermediaries should decline.
Similarly, the demand for bankers' skill in evaluating particular invest-
ments should be expected to decline as secondary and new issue markets
4. Pension fund assets, which now exceed two trillion dollars, include nearly a quarter of all
equity securities and half of all corporate debt. The pension fund, now the dominant player in the
world of institutional investing, scarcely existed a century ago, and was unimportant until the latter
half of this century. In 1950, pension plans accounted for only 15.3% of the total holdings of institu-
tional investors; by 1983 pension fund holdings had risen to 58.5% of institutional investments. R.
IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 157 (1986).
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develop. As secondary capital markets develop, business firms will find it
increasingly easy to raise capital by making public offerings. The sophis-
tication of the trading markets provides a dependable price setting mech-
anism that permits investors to rely on anonymous market forces rather
than on the judgment of particular bankers to determine the appropriate
prices for investments.5 In addition, trading markets such as the New
York Stock Exchange enable firms in search of capital to "securitize"
their assets. Securitization involves unbundling the earnings stream of a
firm into a large number of securities that can be sold to small investors,
thus competing directly with banks' ability to transform illiquid invest-
ments into liquid investments for the benefit of depositors.
Finally, as trading markets become more developed due to the emer-
gence of more sophisticated mechanisms for processing information,
bankers must compete for business against the participants in those mar-
kets as well. Businesses in need of capital will be indifferent between
borrowing from banks and selling securities in a public offering. They
will make their decision on the basis of which form of investment offers
them the capital they need at the lowest rate of interest. Consequently,
the emergence of well developed capital markets inevitably places down-
ward pressure on banks' rates of return. The emergence of these markets
also confronts the specialists who evaluate credit risk for commercial
banks (loan officers) with new competition from thousands of financial
analysts and amateur investors who are attempting to ferret out informa-
tion about the earnings streams of publicly traded securities. As a result,
the development of securities markets will make it increasingly difficult
for banks to uncover profitable investment opportunities.
The development of robust capital markets for equity and debt securi-
ties and the growth of pension plans and money market funds are a natu-
ral outgrowth of the emergence of new information technologies and the
general development of the economy. As information and data process-
ing capabilities have improved, the costs of trading have fallen. These
markets developed because investors now can communicate with one an-
other, and can obtain new information about corporate cash flows,
quickly and cheaply by using computer-driven trading systems.
Likewise, as the labor force has become more skilled and productive, it
has been able to command an increasing share of society's resources.
5. See Macey & Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud on the Market
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990).
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Favorable tax treatment has led to explosive growth in the nation's pen-
sion system. Furthermore, as technological developments have caused
the nation's capital markets to price securities more efficiently, such mar-
kets have become available to smaller and smaller issuers. In 1792, the
New York Stock Exchange was the nation's only public securities mar-
ket.6 Today there are ten stock exchanges operating in the United States
as well as several specialized exchanges that have added trading in op-
tions and financial futures to their traditional business of trading in com-
modities. In addition, the over-the-counter securities market includes
three thousand securities firms with six thousand branch offices that deal
in securities not traded on an organized exchange.7 There are no listing
requirements for securities traded on the over-the-counter market; all
registered securities are entitled to participate in this market. Brokers
trade securities in this market "via a complex telephone and telex com-
munications system, by which information is transmitted and trades are
consummated." 8
In a nutshell, as markets become more efficient, the information, eval-
uation and transaction services provided by commercial banks are in-
creasingly displaced by newer and more efficient forms of financial
intermediation. It is important to note, moreover, that bankers histori-
cally have specialized in servicing the most inefficient segments of the
capital markets. More efficient market segments have been able to
securitize themselves and thereby avoid more costly commercial loan
markets. As financial markets have developed and as a wider array of
assets have become capable of being securitized, bankers have been
driven to focus on increasingly uncertain investments that remain inca-
pable of being securitized. Thus, as capital markets and technology have
developed, not only have commercial banks' share of investment markets
declined, but the portion they have retained has become more risky;
lower cost financial intermediaries have skimmed off much of the best
business that commercial banks traditionally enjoyed.
The traditional bank loan involves ongoing, continuous monitoring on
the part of the bank extending the credit or making the loan. The typical
loan document gives banks the right to accelerate the maturity date of
their outstanding loans. Banks, seeking to protect their investments,
6. Macey & Haddock, Shirking at the SEC. The Failure of the National Market System, 1985
U. ILL. L. REv. 315 (describing the origins of the NYSE).
7. R. SOBEL, INSIDE WALL STREET 67 (1982).
8. Macey & Haddock, supra note 6, at 329-330.
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carefully monitor the firms to which they loan money on an ongoing
basis. By contrast, the process of securitization involves intense monitor-
ing by the underwriters at the time a block of securities initially is offered
to the public.9 After the securities are sold, however, it is expected that
the subsequent monitoring of the issuer will be less intense because of the
well-known collective action and free-rider problems facing those who
invested in the issuers' securities. In particular, unlike banks, many in-
vestors who buy securities will engage in little, if any, monitoring of
credit because they must incur the full costs of monitoring the issuer,
while only capturing a small portion of the gains from such monitoring.°
Those firms that cannot obtain credit unless they subject themselves to
the continual monitoring performed by banks will continue to seek bank
loans. All else being equal, borrowing from a commercial bank will be
more costly than raising capital by issuing securities because banks must
charge more interest on loans to compensate for the continual monitor-
ing associated with such lending. Of course, all else is not equal. The
existence of federally subsidized deposit insurance enables banks to ob-
tain funds more cheaply than securities firms because depositors demand
far lower interest rates on demand deposits than they would in the ab-
sence of government-backed deposit insurance. These cheaper funds
tend to offset banks' increased costs. Moreover, these cheaper, federally
insured deposits were used to fund increasingly risky investments
throughout the 1980s.
Firms able to obtain credit from the securities markets will do so in
order to avoid the burden of bank monitoring and to avoid the concomi-
tantly higher rates charged by banks in many cases. Of course, firms that
need only occasional or episodic monitoring are likely to be better credit
risks than firms that need constant monitoring. Thus, all else being
equal, borrowers that are better credit risks will sell securities rather than
borrow from banks because such borrowers will have no desire to pay the
higher costs of obtaining the continuous monitoring available from com-
mercial banks.
This process is highlighted by the ability of investment banks, through
the underwriting of commercial paper, to capture a large portion of the
9. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 650, 654
(1984).
10. Id. at 653. We wish, however, to emphasize that the reduction in bank monitoring in
trading markets is replaced by market mechanisms such as the market for corporate control, incen-
tive-based compensation packages for managers, and competition in internal labor markets.
1991]
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most basic commercial lending business of the nation's largest commer-
cial banks. Commercial paper is the popular name for the short-term 1
unsecured debt obligations of corporations that have become a common
feature in American corporate finance, particularly for large, well capi-
talized corporations with aggressive asset and liability management strat-
egies. Commercial paper bears similarities to securities such as stocks
and bonds, and to commercial loans made by banks.' 2 Like stocks and
bonds, commercial paper is sold in the secondary market, usually in ne-
gotiated underwritings with securities dealers. Like bank loans, commer-
cial paper generally is sold in privately negotiated transactions between a
single underwriting firm and a single issuing company. Issuing firms
view the sale of commercial paper as a direct substitute for other forms of
financing because it provides ready access to capital, does not create long
term financial obligations, and does not require extensive and costly ne-
gotiations prior to issuance.13
Firms in need of capital can choose to issue commercial paper, obtain
traditional bank financing, or sell stocks or bonds in the secondary mar-
kets. Their choice is significantly affected by federal regulation. Since
1933, the Glass-Steagall Act14 has imposed a legal separation between
commercial banking and securities dealing. With minor exceptions for
such things as municipal bonds and U.S. government securities, the
Glass-Steagall Act prohibits banks from underwriting, selling, or dealing
in securities.15 Firms that wish to sell securities to raise capital therefore
have no choice but to do so through investment banks and securities
houses. On the other hand, firms that wish to raise capital by direct
borrowing can do so not only from commercial banks but also from any
other person or firm willing to extend credit.
This regulatory disadvantage for many years was not a significant im-
pediment to banks' ability to compete in the financial markets against
other sorts of financial intermediaries, because of the extensive regulatory
11. Typically, commercial paper matures in 90 days or less.
12. Litt, Macey, Miller & Rubin, Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets: Bank Entry
into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United States and Japan, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 369, 375
(1990).
13. Id.
14. The Glass-Steagall Act, officially designated the Banking Act of 1933, is the popular name
of ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
15. Section 16 is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988). 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1988) makes the
restrictions of § 16 of Glass-Steagall applicable to state banks that are members of the Federal Re-
serve System.
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costs of raising capital by selling securities. In particular, firms that
wished to raise substantial amounts of money by selling securities tradi-
tionally were required to make a "public offering" of securities within the
meaning of the securities laws. In 1933, Congress created something of a
"level playing field" for commercial banks and securities firms by impos-
ing significant costs on firms that wished to make public offerings of se-
curities. These costs, which come in the form of registration and
prospectus delivery requirements of the Securities Act of 1933,16 reduced
the attractiveness of securities offerings. It is in this sense that the Secur-
ities Act of 1933 mitigated the harsh effects of Glass-Steagall's regulatory
restrictions by increasing the demand for commercial banks' lending
services as against securities dealers' underwriting services.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, commercial paper became the
primary source of short-term financing for publicly held corporations.
During this period, commercial paper accounted for one quarter of all
short-term corporate debt outstanding. 17 For issuing corporations, com-
mercial paper has distinct advantages over both commercial bank bor-
rowing and public securities offerings. The advantage of commercial
paper over a public offering of debt or equity is that commercial paper,
by virtue of its short maturity, is exempt from the costly registration
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.8 Technical improvements in
the commercial paper market greatly enhanced the liquidity characteris-
tics of that market and enabled securities firms to sell commercial paper
at lower rates of interest. By passing these interest rate savings along to
their clients, investment banks selling commercial paper were able to of-
fer corporate borrowers rates of interest on commercial paper signifi-
cantly below the bank prime rate.
Large corporations increasingly began to turn from commercial bank
lending to the commercial paper market to fund their short-term financ-
ing needs as "[t]he spreads and placement costs on commercial paper fell
low enough that a corporation could often save money by going directly
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77 et. seq. (1988).
17. Note, A Conduct Oriented Approach to the Glass-Steagall Act, 91 YALE L.J. 102, 115 (198 1)
(Jonathan R. Macey, author, citing J.P. JUDD, COMPETITION BETWEEN COMMERCIAL PAPER
MARKETS AND COMMERCIAL BANKS 39, 48 (Staff Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
on file with the Yale Law Journal)).
18. The Securities Act of 1933, § 3(aX3), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1988) exempts from the regis-
tration, prospectus delivery, and anti-fraud provisions of the Act notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and
bankers' acceptances arising out of a current transaction that have a maturity at the time of issuance
of less than nine months.
1991]
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into the commercial paper market rather than by obtaining funds from a
bank or other financial intermediary."19 The difficulties this presented to
commercial banks were acute and far-reaching:
Once having entered the commercial paper market, many firms were reluc-
tant to return to higher-cost bank financing, even when bank funds became
readily available again.... Banks, to their surprise and dismay, began to
see commercial paper as a threatening competitor for their core loan
business.
The problem was not simply a loss of loan revenues, although this was
bad enough. In addition, commercial banks were deprived of key informa-
tion about the activities of their loan customers. In the days when corpora-
tions returned to their banks frequently to roll over commercial loans,
banks were able to maintain regular contact with their customers and thus
to obtain reliable, current information about them. That source of informa-
tion began to dry up as blue chip corporations increasingly turned to the
commercial paper market for their short-term financing needs. 20
Several important points can be gleaned from the commercial paper
saga. First, it illustrates how commercial banks' inability to expand their
product lines beyond traditional commercial lending made it difficult for
them to compete in the rapidly changing financial marketplace. Second,
it is a striking example of the earlier theoretical point that the business
lost by commercial banks due to regulatory restrictions has not been ran-
dom. Rather, commercial banks have been losing their best business and
their most important customers because as participants in secondary
trading markets become more sophisticated they can take advantage of
technology. This technology permits them to securitize assets that previ-
ously could only be financed through traditional bank lending. Over
time, investment bankers developed sophisticated trading strategies that
allowed them to sell commercial paper to customers with the express or
implied promise that, should the need arise, the investment bank would
repurchase the securities at the market price for the remainder of their
terms. Ironically, the availability of back-up lines of credit from com-
mercial banks has further enhanced the competitiveness of commercial
paper markets. Investment banks thus were able to offer investors in
commercial paper meaningful liquidity over the short-term life of the
loans, which in turn, enabled them to make credible financing commit-
ments to borrowers. The emergence of commercial paper as an impor-
19. Litt, Macey, Miller & Rubin, supra note 12, at 378.
20. Id. at 379.
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tant tool of corporate finance reveals a story about how the nation's
major commercial banks lost their most important, profitable, blue-chip
clients to a rival industry through a combination of regulatory impedi-
ments and technological evolution.
The final chapter in the commercial paper saga concerns the commer-
cial banks' response to the crisis presented by the erosion of their com-
mercial lending customer base. Led by Bankers Trust Company of New
York, the commercial banks responded by re-evaluating their "long-ac-
cepted notion that the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited them from dealing
in commercial paper."2 Rather than cut their commercial lending rates
to compete with the investment banks, they sought to enter the business
of underwriting and dealing in commercial paper.
Two important implications can be drawn here. First, the natural re-
sponse to financial market innovation is not to expand the scope of com-
mercial banking but to diversify into investment banking. Over time, as
improved markets and new technologies lead to an increase in the de-
mand for securitized assets and a decrease in the demand for commercial
loans, market forces should cause the commercial banking industry to
shrink rather than to expand. Second, the legal system has placed costly
obstacles in the way of banks that wish to pursue this strategy. In our
example, Bankers Trust Company had only two options: (1) giving up
its traditional core business of lending to large, blue chip clients, or
(2) pursuing a risky and costly strategy of litigating the apparent legal
restrictions on its ability to deal in commercial paper. Bankers Trust
chose the latter strategy.
The commercial paper saga presents a stark example of the competi-
tive dynamic facing the commercial banking industry. As financial mar-
kets have developed, the same process has repeated itself, albeit in a more
subtle fashion and in numerous ways: bank clients gradually have re-
duced the portion of their external funding that comes from bank lending
and increased the funding they receive from selling securities.
This process simultaneously has reduced the role that commercial
banks play in the economy and caused banks to become more risky. The
reduced role is a result of a decreased demand for commercial lending.
Risk has increased because the assets that have become securitized are
the assets for which good information is readily available, i.e, those that
present less commercial uncertainty.
21. Id.
1991]
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We wish to emphasize that the process we are describing is slow and
subtle, although rapid advancements in information technology have al-
lowed U.S. securities markets to register dramatic improvements in effi-
ciency in the past decade. For most creditworthy borrowers, the process
we are describing has not resulted in a complete shift from bank borrow-
ing to securitization, although for large, publicly held corporations the
shift from bank borrowing to commercial paper issuance has been dra-
matic. Rather, the process of technological evolution we are describing
has manifested itself in a gradual change in the overall composition of the
liability side of the corporate balance sheet, with bank borrowing assum-
ing a smaller fraction of overall liabilities, and other forms of debt assum-
ing a larger fraction.
Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon involves the securitiza-
tion of home mortgages and other consumer financial obligations, which
began in earnest in the 1980s. Historically, commercial banks carried
home mortgages on the asset side of their balance sheets as loans. These
mortgages were high profit, low risk assets for banks. But as computer
and communications technology made it cheaper to collect and dissemi-
nate information, and as interest rates and asset prices became more vol-
atile, it became much more efficient for banks to move these assets off
their books by securitizing them. The securitization phenomenon had a
profound effect on U.S. capital markets:
by the third quarter of 1987, mortgage-backed securities outstanding ex-
ceeded $640 billion, over one-fifth of the total value of all mortgage claims.
Since 1982, mortgage-backed securities have accounted for 60 percent of
the growth in mortgage debt. The sale of other asset-backed obligations-
debt instruments that are claims against a pool of assets such as
automobiles, credit-card receivables, or leases-only began in 1985. Yet in
just two years the amount of these securities outstanding had risen to al-
most $12 billion. By the end of 1986, GMAC (General Motors Acceptance
Corporation) was the largest issuer of nonmortgage asset-backed obliga-
tions, with $8 billion outstanding.22
The securitization phenomenon was bad for banks in three ways.
First, the fees for securitizing a loan are trivial compared to the profits
involved in booking the loan as an asset. Unfortunately, the costs of
keeping a loan on the books as an asset are also high, particularly when
interest rates are rising and the asset has a fixed interest rate. Thus,
22. Haraf & Kushmeider, Redefining Financial Markets, in RESTRUCTURING BANKING AND
FINANCIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA 3 (1988).
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banks that did not securitize assets that were capable of being securitized
could not compete with banks that did so. Second, because commercial
banks have no competitive advantage in securitization, the business of
originating loans opened up to a myriad of specialized firms, thereby fur-
ther eroding the market share of commercial banks. Finally, to the ex-
tent that banks attempted to continue to book commercial loans, they
were forced to concentrate on increasingly risky loans, as the better
credit risks came to be securitized.
In summary, during the 1980s, borrowers that traditionally looked to
banks for credit began to turn to other, cheaper sources such as securi-
tized assets and commercial paper. This phenomenon left commercial
banks a shrinking and increasingly risky segment of the capital markets
to service. Problems on the liability side of banks' balance sheets exacer-
bated the problems on the asset side. Here, the growth of pension funds,
mutual funds, and new insurance products has given savers and investors
a wide range of new products from which to choose. This has forced
banks to pay increasingly high rates to attract depositors, despite the in-
creasing riskiness of the banks' activities. Given such a competitive envi-
ronment, it would have been surprising had commercial banks not begun
to fail in record numbers during the 1980s.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TREASURY'S REFORM PROPOSAL
The most important implication of the above analysis is that any suc-
cessful proposal to reform banking policy must reflect the fact that the
only healthy banking industry is going to be a significantly smaller bank-
ing industry. While the firms engaged in commercial banking need not
be small, the portion of economic activity conducted by commercial
banks, as opposed to other suppliers of credit, is going to continue to
shrink. Accordingly, no regulatory solution premised on the assumption
that the commercial banking industry can "grow its way" out of the cur-
rent crisis likely will succeed. Instead, the regulatory policies concerning
bank failures should be changed to encourage the liquidation, rather than
the merger, of failed banks and to encourage banks to diversify, either by
expanding the scope of their internal operations, or by merging with
firms in industries other than banking. We hasten to add that the best
outcome of all would be a regulatory regime that encouraged voluntary
transfers of bank assets to willing purchasers.
Second, as explored more fully below, market forces must be allowed
to exert disciplinary pressure on bank managers who are not performing
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adequately. Regulatory oversight is an insufficient constraint on bad
managers. The current Treasury proposal does not contain effective
measures for changing current rules and regulatory practices that under-
mine the incentives of market participants to impose market discipline on
poorly managed banks.
III. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE TREASURY PROPOSAL
The current Treasury proposal contains five principal recommenda-
tions. Two deal with deposit insurance. The first recommendation is to
"preserve deposit insurance protection for every small saver in
America"2 3 and at the same time to "protect taxpayers by reducing
overextended deposit insurance coverage."' 24 This would be done by lim-
iting protection to two $100,000 accounts per institution, prohibiting
"brokered deposits," and requiring that insurance premiums be adjusted
according to the riskiness of individual banks, measured by the amount
of capital on their balance sheets. Depositors could still have accounts
with multiple institutions, as long as a deposit broker was not used to
place the additional accounts. Finally, the Treasury proposal would not
base deposit insurance premiums on market-based risk factors, i.e., the
riskiness of the banks whose deposits are being insured. Instead insur-
ance premiums would be based on crude estimates of the amount of capi-
tal on the bank's balance sheet.
In addition to deposit insurance reform, the Treasury Department's
remaining recommendations consist of making banks stronger and safer
by strengthening the role that capital plays in bank regulation, moderniz-
ing outdated banking laws, and making the regulatory structure more
efficient.
Reforming the regulatory treatment of capital has been called the
"centerpiece of the Treasury proposal. '25 The Treasury proposal would
assign all banks to one of five supervisory zones, based on regulators'
assessment of the bank's capital levels. Zone 1 would include banks that
have levels of risk-based capital "significantly above" what are consid-
ered minimum acceptable levels. Zone 2 would include banks that satisfy
23. US. Department of the Treasury, Secretary Nicholas F. Brady, Remarks to the Press on
Financial Services Reform, February 5, 1991, 13 L.A. Bus. J. § 1, at 29 (1991).
24. Id.
25. Muckenfuss, Eager, & Nielsen, The Treasury Department Report: Modernizing the Finan-
cial System-Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks, BANK MANAGEMENT, Apr.
1991, at 12, 13.
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minimum acceptable levels, while Zones 3, 4, and 5 would, in varying
degrees, include all banks that fail to meet minimum acceptable capital
levels. Banks that do not fall into the appropriate zone would be prohib-
ited from engaging in non-banking activities through a financial services
holding company, and would be subject to additional regulatory con-
straints such as dividend restrictions, growth constraints, and conserva-
torship, depending on how far capital levels deviate from acceptable
levels. Finally, the Treasury proposes to use its zone allocation to deter-
mine deposit insurance premiums to be charged by the FDIC.
For well capitalized banks, the Treasury department's goal of modern-
izing outdated banking laws would be accomplished by allowing such
banks to engage in investment banking and other activities, which histor-
ically have been out of bounds for commercial banks and bank holding
companies, as well as by lifting the current restrictions on interstate
branching. The Treasury proposal would permit companies that own
banks to engage in a whole range of non-banking activities that currently
are impermissible under the Bank Holding Company Act, including a
full range of securities activities.
Finally, the Treasury proposal would create a new regulatory structure
for commercial banking by abolishing the Office of Thrift Supervision
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and assigning their
activities to a new bureau inside the Treasury Department, the Office of
Depository Institutions Supervision (ODIS). The Federal Reserve Board
would assume responsibility as the federal regulator and supervisor of all
state banks except state savings banks. Thus the Fed would replace the
FDIC as primary regulator for state-chartered banks that are not mem-
bers of the FDIC, except for state savings banks, which would be regu-
lated by the ODIS.
A. The False Promise of Deposit Insurance Reform
There are a number of flaws with the Treasury approach to deposit
insurance reform. First, the Treasury proposal does not reflect fully the
relationship between deposit insurance protection and bank failure pol-
icy, as reflected in the determination that some banks simply are too big
to be allowed to fail. No deposit insurance reform proposal will be suc-
cessful in reducing the pressure on the deposit insurance funds until it
changes the FDIC's bank failure policy, which results in defacto deposit
insurance protection for virtually all depositors in commercial banks, re-
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gardless of how many accounts they have or even how large their depos-
its are.
There are four basic regulatory options currently available for dealing
with insolvent and nearly insolvent banks.26 First, the FDIC can employ
the deposit-payout approach and liquidate the insolvent bank. When an
insolvent bank is liquidated, the FDIC, in its capacity as insurer, pays off
the insured depositors in the bank. The other depositors stand in line
with other creditors to receive their pro rata share of the assets of the
liquidated bank. Where the deposit-payout option is invoked by regula-
tors, uninsured depositors face a realistic risk of losing a substantial por-
tion of their investment. Similarly, in an insured deposit transfer, rather
than liquidating the bank, the FDIC funds an acquiror who pays a pre-
mium for the "core insured deposits" of the failed bank, and, in addition,
purchases some or all of the assets of the failed bank.
Second, the FDIC may employ open-bank assistance to keep a trou-
bled bank afloat by providing direct financial assistance to enable the
bank to continue to meet its creditors' demands. Where open-bank
assistance is employed, the FDIC provides capital to the troubled bank
by purchasing its bad loans or buying its newly issued preferred stock or
other securities. Unlike the deposit-payout approach, open-bank assist-
ance protects all creditors of the bank against loss-including all deposi-
tors of any size-because the bank continues to be able to meet all of its
obligations as a result of the infusion of cash.
The FDIC's third option when confronted with an insolvent bank is
the purchase and assumption transaction. Under this approach, the de-
posit liabilities of the failed bank are assumed by another bank, which
purchases some of the failed bank's assets. The important feature of the
purchase and assumption transaction is that, as with open bank assist-
ance, all of the depositors in the failed bank-including uninsured depos-
itors-are completely protected against loss.
Although the FDIC is obligated by law to select the mechanism for
resolving bank failures that involves the least cost to the FDIC, the
agency uses the purchase and assumption transaction, except where there
is no interest by other banks in acquiring the failed bank.27
26. For a more extended discussion of the regulatory options available to dispose of the assets
of failed banks, see Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank
Control, 88 COLUM. L. Rav. 1153 (1988).
27. Gilbert, Recent Changes in Handling Bank Failures and Their Effects on the Banking In-
dustry, ECON. REV., June-July 1985, at 17 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
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New powers granted to the FDIC under the Financial Institutions Re-
form Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)28 enhance its
ability to arrange bank mergers and thus to avoid liquidation, even when
a suitable merger partner cannot be found immediately. The FDIC may
do this by transferring some or all of the failed bank's assets and liabili-
ties to a "bridge bank" that agrees to manage them until the agency finds
a permanent acquiror. Under FIRREA, the FDIC may organize a
bridge bank whenever one or more insured banks are in default, or when
it anticipates that one or more insured banks may default on their
obligations.29
The FDIC's final option is to execute a "modified payout" transac-
tion. ° The modified payout approach combines attributes of a straight
liquidation (deposit payout), and the bank merger (purchase and assump-
tion transaction).31 In particular, the modified payout approach, unlike
open-bank assistance, and unlike a straight purchase and assumption
transaction, inserts some sorely needed elements of market discipline.3 2
Under a modified payout, the FDIC pays off the failed bank's obliga-
tions to insured depositors in full. In contrast to open-bank assistance
and deposit payouts, however, only partial payments are made to unin-
sured depositors. These partial payments are based on the FDIC's esti-
mate of what these depositors would receive in the event of a liquidation
of the failed bank. If it turns out that actual recoveries exceed this initial
estimate, the uninsured depositors receive additional payments.3 3 The
modified payout has been described as follows:
Like a P&A (purchase and assumption) transaction, a modified payout
does not disrupt the insured depositor's activities because these bank liabili-
ties are transferred to another bank. As with P&A, the FDIC arranges the
merger of the failed bank with a healthy bank and provides cash to cover
any shortfall between the value of the assets purchased and the value of the
liabilities assumed by the healthy bank. The major difference between the
two types of transactions is that the modified payout provides uninsured
28. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183.
29. FIRREA § 214, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n) (Supp. 1 1989).
30. Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Em-
pirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 237 (1988).
31. Note, The Modified Payoff of Failed Banks A Settlement Practice To Inject Market Disci-
pline into the Commercial Banking System, 73 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1378-81 (1987).
32. Macey & Miller, supra note 26, at 1184.
33. Gilbert, supra note 27, at 22. While the uninsured depositors receive extra payments if the
FDIC initially underestimates the proceeds of a liquidation or merger, if the FDIC overestimates the
proceeds of such a transaction, the FDIC will absorb the losses associated with its mistake. Id.
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depositors with a significant incentive for monitoring the banks where their
funds are held and for imposing disciplining on excessive risk taking.
34
The FDIC developed the modified payout in 1983 and used it in
twenty-one bank failures between 1983 and 1985. 31 For a variety of rea-
sons, the modified payout system is superior both to the purchase and
assumption transaction and to open-bank assistance as a method of deal-
ing with failed banks. In particular, the banking system would benefit
enormously from the market discipline that large uninsured depositors
exert. Many of these depositors are themselves banks, and hence are
uniquely suited to serve as monitors.
The FDIC never has explained officially why it abandoned the modi-
fied-payout approach,36 which many commentators heralded as a great
innovation. 37  The FDIC claims that it uses purchase and assumption
transactions rather than straight liquidations as its strategy of choice in
handling bank failures because purchase and assumption transactions are
less costly. This is false. The mergers that take place under purchase
and assumption transactions generally require the repurchase of assets
"purchased" by the bank making the acquisition if such assets later go
into default. For other assets, the FDIC guarantees a certain rate of re-
turn to the acquiring bank under what are known as "yield maintenance
agreements." These agreements insure acquirors a substantial rate of re-
turn on assets not resold to the FDIC. Hence, when bank failures are
resolved as purchase and assumption transactions, not only is the bank-
ing system deprived of the benefits of depositor discipline, but the FDIC
34. Macey & Miller, supra note 26, at 1185. On average, uninsured depositors received over
40% of their claims in the modified payouts used during this period. Id.
35. Note, supra note 30, at 1378 n.174, 1380.
36. Id. at 1382-84; Macey & Miller, supra note 26, at 1185.
37. One commentator has noted that the FDIC experiment with modified payoffs "ended ab-
ruptly when the Continental Bank crisis began." Bank regulators did not think that a modified
payoff of Continental would work due to the size of the bank and the large number of uninsured
depositors. Rather than liquidate Continental (no other bank was willing to participate in a
purchase and assumption transaction with the FDIC and Continental), the FDIC provided Conti-
nental with direct assistance. See Cagane, Maintaining Financial Stability: Financial Strains and
Public Policy, in DEicrrs, TAxES AND ECONOMIc ADJUSTMENTS 181, 194 (1989). The rescue of
Continental Bank "subjected bank regulators to criticism for treating large and small banks differ-
ently." Their policies, it was said, were encouraging a "flight to size," rather than a "flight to qual-
ity," and excessive concentration of deposits in the very largest banks. In response to these
pressures, William Seidman, the chairman of the FDIC, announced in March 1986 that to maintain
equality of treatment for banks of all sizes, the FDIC would undertake P&As whenever feasible. In
other words, "Seidman instituted a policy of defacto 100 percent coverage for all depositors when
feasible." Id. (citations omitted).
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assumes significant future contingent liabilities on the deals it makes with
acquiring banks.
The Treasury Department's proposed reforms of the deposit insurance
system will be futile unless there also is an overhaul of the administrative
procedures for disposing of failed banks. Under current procedures, so-
phisticated depositors can direct their deposits to those banks that are
likely to merge with another bank in case of insolvency or otherwise are
considered "too big to fail" and thus likely to be bailed out. The odds of
a sophisticated depositor (uninsured depositors are virtually always insti-
tutions) finding itself with deposits in a bank being liquidated are rela-
tively small. Thus, the Treasury Department's proposed reforms would
remove the de jure deposit insurance protection for some large deposi-
tors, but would have no practical effect since large depositors would still,
in all likelihood, enjoy the defacto protection of the liberal deposit liabil-
ity assumption policies currently in place.
While the Treasury proposal seems to acknowledge implicitly many of
the arguments made here, it does not go nearly far enough. First and
foremost, the proposal does not eliminate the "too big to fail" regulatory
policy employed most notoriously in 1984 when Chicago's Continental
Illinois Bank became insolvent. Under this policy, certain banks simply
are deemed too big to fail because the failure of such banks would cause
undue disruption to the financial system as a whole."8 This policy creates
opportunities for strategic behavior and unfairness because large deposi-
tors shift their assets out of smaller banks that are not considered too big
to fail and into the nation's largest banks.
Currently, however, there is little incentive for depositors to shift their
funds to big banks because even large, uninsured depositors in small and
medium-sized banks are protected under standing regulatory practices.
The Treasury proposal possibly may make it somewhat more difficult for
the bank regulators to structure purchase and assumption transactions,
because, under the proposal, the FDIC could not consummate a
purchase and assumption transaction unless such a transaction is
cheaper than all regulatory options. Under current regulations, the
FDIC can consummate a purchase and assumption transaction as long as
it decides that such a transaction is cheaper than a liquidation. But since
a liquidation is often the cheapest method for disposing of the assets of a
38. I. SPRAGUE, BAILOUT: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF BANK FAILURES AND RESCUES 183
(1986).
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failed bank, it is not entirely clear that the Treasury proposal will change
existing regulatory practice. Indeed, John D. Hawke, one of the nation's
foremost banking attorneys, has astutely observed that the administra-
tion's proposal to protect uninsured depositors only if the FDIC deter-
mines it to be the least costly means of resolving the bank failure is
virtually indistinguishable from the current practice.39
The greatest prospect for improving current practice lies in the Treas-
ury proposal's apparent revival of the ability of bank regulators to engage
in transactions similar to the modified payout transactions described
above. In particular, the Treasury proposal appears to contemplate that
the FDIC will use insured deposit payouts or insured deposit transfers
for resolving bank failures.' In an insured deposit payout, as in the
modified payout system described above, the FDIC pays insured deposi-
tors the amount of their insured deposits, liquidates the failed institution,
and distributes the proceeds to creditors, including uninsured depositors.
Unfortunately, the Treasury proposal still leaves regulators with far
too much discretion as to the method for disposing of failed banks. In
particular, the FDIC still would be given an undesirably large amount of
discretion to resolve bank failures by means of purchase and assumption
transactions in which all uninsured depositors are protected. Moreover,
it is not clear that uninsured depositors will be affected, even if the Treas-
ury proposal results in more bank failures being handled by liquidations
and insured deposit transfers rather than by purchase and assumption
transactions. This is because the Treasury proposal envisions that bank
regulators will continue to keep large insolvent banks operational
through federal bailouts in the form of open-bank assistance transactions.
Thus, at best, the Treasury proposal will result in a massive disparity in
regulatory treatment between big banks and smaller banks, with unin-
sured depositors in small and medium-sized banks facing a realistic pros-
pect of losing money in the event of a bank failure, and depositors in
large banks enjoying complete protection.
The Treasury proposal, in fact, exacerbates the problems associated
with the availability of open-bank assistance as a regulatory option be-
cause the proposal shifts authority to decide whether to give open-bank
assistance from the FDIC to the Department of the Treasury and the
39. Banking Reform Plan Faces Major Hurdles on Capital Hill: Industry Reaction Mixed
BANKING REP. (BNA) No.6, at 229 (Feb. 11, 1991).
40. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS GROUP, ANALYSIS OF THE FI-
NANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SAFETY AND CONSUMER CHOICE ACT OF 1991, at 8 (1991).
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Federal Reserve Board. This re-allocation of regulatory authority will
create a bizarre state of affairs in which the Treasury and the Fed decide
whether to employ open-bank assistance, while the FDIC retains the re-
sponsibility for providing the direct financial assistance required under
such assistance plans. This inevitably will lead to a decline in accounta-
bility and an increase in the use of open-bank assistance, since the regula-
tors at the Treasury and the Fed can enjoy all of the political benefits
associated with keeping large insolvent banks in operation, but can shift
all of the costs of pursuing such a policy to the FDIC.
Allocating regulatory authority to the Fed to determine whether insol-
vent banks should be given open-bank assistance is particularly bizarre in
light of the fact that the Fed can and does use the discount window as a
vehicle for giving distressed banks access to cheap credit. Thus the Fed
can make loans available to an insolvent bank through the discount win-
dow and later "decide" that it should be reimbursed by the FDIC by
requiring the FDIC to extend open-bank assistance to the insolvent bank.
This allocation of regulatory authority appears even more bizarre once
one recognizes the fact that uninsured depositors frequently remove their
deposits from banks that avail themselves of the discount window as a
means of obtaining liquidity. Not only should the Fed not be permitted
to decide when open-bank assistance should be used, but the central bank
also should not be permitted to make the discount window available to
insolvent banks. The discount window should be used to provide liquid-
ity only to solvent banks, and occasionally, as a tool of monetary policy.
Thus, the Treasury proposal may result in little, if any, change in cur-
rent regulatory practices. Indeed, the Treasury's plan could result in a
massive inequality in the way problems of large banks and smaller banks
are resolved. This inequality, in turn, will cause large depositors to shift
their funds from small and medium-sized banks to large banks in order
to enjoy the benefits of the government's policy of treating some banks as
"too big to fail."
Another problem with the Treasury proposal's response to failed
banks stems from the assumptions being made about which form of reso-
lution will involve the "least cost to the deposit insurance fund."41 Regu-
lators appear to be taking the position that insured deposit transfers are
cheaper than insured deposit payouts because, in the insured deposit
41. Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991 (FISCCA), H.R. 1505, S.
713, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 103(a)(l)c (1991).
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transfer, the FDIC saves the cost of a liquidation and also obtains a pre-
mium for the core insured deposits.42 This assumption is flawed for two
reasons. First, the costs of liquidating the failed bank must be compared
to the costs associated with the substantial discounts the acquiring bank
applies to the value of the failed banks' assets in order to induce it to do
the deal. Second, regulators often give acquirors yield maintenance guar-
antees and buy-back options, which add costs that must be factored into
the value of the merger.
Finally, and most importantly, we wish to observe that, regardless of
whether the FDIC disposes of failed bank assets through merger or liqui-
dation, the significant costs of delay should be factored into its calculus.
Not only does the market value of these assets decline rapidly when they
are transferred to the Resolution Trust Corporation, but the cost of
maintenance and up-keep for the assets is a staggering twenty percent of
the value of the property.43 Thus, all else being equal, the FDIC should
be required to select the asset disposition strategy that returns the assets
of failed banks to the private sector as quickly as possible.
B. Strengthening Capital Requirements
At the heart of the Treasury's proposal is its plan to provide banks
with incentives to improve their capital positions by permitting only well-
capitalized banks to engage in new activities, including securities under-
writing. The theory behind rewarding banks for maintaining strong capi-
tal positions is both sound and straightforward. Capital serves as a
cushion to protect creditors such as the FDIC from risk of loss. As a
bank's capital ratio goes up, risks to the insurance fund should decline
because this increased capital will cushion against future unforeseen
shocks to the bank's financial condition. In order for capital adequacy
regulation to work, therefore, the capital requirements imposed on banks
must vary with the riskiness of the bank's assets. It would be wildly
inappropriate, for example, to require a bank whose assets are 100 per-
cent invested in U.S. government bonds to maintain the same level of
capital as banks whose assets are invested in junk bonds and undeveloped
real estate.
One of the major flaws in the Treasury proposal is that it fails to distin-
42. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, supra note 39, at 8.
43. Macey, While Politicians Fiddle Banking Crises Explode, L.A. Times, Sept. 23, 1990, at
M4, col.3.
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guish adequately among bank assets on the basis of the quality of those
assets. The Treasury proposal adopts the definition of "capital" con-
tained in the report of the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and
Supervisory Practices. This definition is deeply flawed because it lumps
assets together in a manner that is too crude to be of real value in distin-
guishing well-capitalized from poorly capitalized banks. For example, all
commercial loans, residential loans, and standby letters of credit to mu-
nicipalities that back their general obligations are treated identically, de-
spite the fact that the actual risks associated with each may vary widely.
Not only are these capital requirements an inappropriate means of de-
termining whether a bank is well capitalized, the incentives contained in
the Treasury proposal will cause banks inefficiently to shift their lending
strategies to improve their apparent capital position. For example, under
the Treasury's capital guidelines, a bank could improve its capital posi-
tion by calling in loans to private corporations and using the funds to
finance residential properties, since the capitalization rules treat loans on
such residential properties more favorably than loans to corporations.
Even though loans to solid corporations are far better credit risks than
many bank loans made to finance residential properties, particularly
under current market conditions, banks have an incentive to make more
real estate loans and fewer corporate loans. Thus, the Treasury proposal
will exacerbate the distortions of the capital adequacy guidelines which
already encourage banks to adopt inefficient lending strategies to improve
their apparent capital positions.
The second problem with the Treasury proposal as it relates to capital
requirements is that its "carrot and stick" approach, which gives holding
companies with well-capitalized banks new powers while holding compa-
nies with poorly capitalized banks get those banks closed down, fails to
appreciate that poorly capitalized banks may benefit more from en-
hanced powers than well-capitalized banks. Well-capitalized banks, by
definition, are able to find lucrative avenues for their investment dollars,
while poorly capitalized banks may be unable to survive unless the scope
of their activities can be expanded. In other words, new powers should
not be viewed simply as political "carrots" that regulators can distribute
to well-financed banks in exchange for past performance. Instead, these
powers should be looked at as opportunities whose benefits may be of
particular value to poorly capitalized banks. The administration, how-
ever, is properly concerned that new powers will be abused to increase
the volatility of a poorly capitalized bank's overall portfolio. However,
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banks can acquire plenty of volatile investments using only traditional
bank powers, so it is not clear how much is gained by the current Treas-
ury proposal.
Put another way, suppose you have two banks, one on the verge of
insolvency, the other in excellent financial shape. Obviously, the bank on
the verge of insolvency is the one whose capital position will be the weak-
est. It is also the -one most in need of new profit-making opportunities.
But the Treasury proposal would not make any of these opportunities
available to the weak bank. Ironically, under the Treasury proposal it is
the strong bank that will be able to avail itself of the ability to extend its
operations to other areas. Quite clearly, not all poorly capitalized banks
should be permitted to expand into new areas. Where a bank is in
trouble because of bad management, for example, no new powers should
be given until management has changed. But new managers will be more
willing to assume control of a weak bank if they can take advantage of
new powers.
C. New Powers
Perhaps the most widely publicized aspects of the Treasury proposal
are the recommendations to repeal antiquated laws that separate com-
mercial banking from investment banking and impede nation-wide
branching and banking. The proposal would permit well-capitalized
banks to affiliate with securities firms and mutual funds through a newly
created corporate entity known as the "financial services holding com-
pany." In addition, the Treasury proposal would permit non-financial
firms to own banks. Specifically, the Treasury plan would permit com-
mercial firms to own financial services holding companies, which in turn
could own banks. Finally, the Treasury proposes that full nationwide
banking be permitted after three years, and that national banks immedi-
ately be given the authority to engage in interstate branching in any state
in which the bank's holding company can acquire a bank.
L Relaxing Geographic Restrictions
The Treasury proposals to relax current restrictions on interstate
banking are the most important and salutary changes contained in the
statute. They will do much to improve the delivery of banking services in
the United States. Section 262 of the Financial Institutions Safety and
Consumer Choice Act (FISCCA) would amend the McFadden Act. The
McFadden Act currently limits branching by national banks to the state
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in which the bank is located, and then only to the extent the statutory
law of the state expressly allows branching by state banks.' The amend-
ments would permit interstate branching by national banks within three
years, or whenever the state of the proposed branch permits interstate
banking by bank holding companies (whichever is sooner). Thirty-three
states, however, already permit nationwide banking by bank holding
companies. Twenty-one of these states permit entry on a reciprocal ba-
sis, and twelve have no restrictions. Another thirteen states permit re-
gional banking. Only four states (Hawaii, Kansas, Montana and North
Dakota) still prohibit all interstate banking.45 The important change in-
cluded in the Treasury proposal is that under the new law, financial serv-
ices holding companies would be able to expand interstate by branching
rather than by acquiring out-of-state banks as separate subsidiaries under
the bank holding company. Moreover, the Treasury proposal would per-
mit existing bank holding companies with networks of separate interstate
banks to convert those separate banks into branch networks.
Even under FISCCA there would be some significant restrictions on
banks' ability to expand. The Treasury proposal would not permit bank
holding companies that have acquired Savings & Loan Associations in
distant states to convert those S & Ls into branches. This seems odd
since these S & Ls often are acquired when they are insolvent, and finan-
cial services companies should be given every incentive to make such
acquisitions. In addition, a national bank that establishes a single branch
in another state could not establish additional branches in places where
state banks could not branch. For example, if a national bank estab-
lished a single branch in a state that permitted only county-wide branch-
ing, the bank could not establish additional branches outside of the
county in which its first branch was located. In addition, national banks
located in states that have regional banking restrictions could not branch
in states that are not party to the interstate compact establishing the
restrictions.
After three years, FISCCA would repeal the Douglas Amendment to
the Bank Holding Company Act." The amendment restricts interstate
acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies by allowing state law to
control interstate banking. At the end of the three year period, FISCCA
44. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1989).
45. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991).
46. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988).
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would preempt state laws that restrict out-of-state financial services hold-
ing companies' entry into the state. FISCCA, however, still would per-
mit states to limit branching internally.
We applaud FISCCA's liberalization of the ability of depository insti-
tutions to expand interstate, because it would permit the realization of
some efficiency gains in bank organization due to the ability of financial
services corporations to establish nation-wide firms to branch networks.
It is doubtful, however, that these changes will result in a major change
in the way banking business is conducted in the United States. Even if
they do, the banking crisis will not be resolved. One reason the law will
not result in major change is that, even after FISCCA, the states still
would control banks' ability to expand internally. Second, as noted
above, because most states already permit significant geographic expan-
sion, the effects of the proposal will be marginal. The major change ef-
fected by the Treasury proposal is that banks will be able to engage in
interstate expansion through branching rather than through holding
company acquisitions of other banks. The ability to expand through
branching rather than through holding company acquisitions may result
in significant efficiency gains and cost savings for some banks.47 How-
ever, as we have explained elsewhere in detail, if the Treasury wanted to
obtain the greatest possible efficiency gains from interstate banking, it
would relax the massive impediments to hostile acquisitions contained in
the Bank Merger Act,"8 the Change in Bank Control Act,4 9 and the anti-
takeover provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act,"° which, taken
together, disable outside bidders from gaining control of poorly managed
banks in hostile acquisitions without regulatory delays that make such
acquisitions all but impossible.51
Third, as technology and communications capabilities have expanded,
geography has become somewhat less important. Banks can attract de-
posits on a national basis by electronic funds transfer. Banks can make
and service loans nationwide by establishing loan production offices,
which are not prohibited under current law, and by having loan officers
travel the country to monitor outstanding loan commitments. Indeed,
47. See Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 16 (1987);
Miller, Interstate Branching and the Constitution, 41 Bus. LAw 337 (1986).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1988).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1817j) (1988).
50. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1988).
51. Macey & Miller, supra note 26, at 1215-1223.
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the increasingly international character of most major corporations has
required modern loan officers to travel extensively in order to keep
abreast of their clients' far-flung empires. Thus, while brick and mortar
branches continue to serve important functions, it seems likely that these
functions will become less central over time as bank customers come to
rely on new technologies.
It is noteworthy that FISCCA would eliminate deposit insurance for
so-called "brokered deposits" by amending the legal definition of the
term "insured deposit" to exclude "funds obtained or accepted, directly
or indirectly, by or through any deposit broker."52 Elimination of de-
posit insurance for brokered deposits is designed to prevent insolvent and
nearly insolvent banks from rapidly expanding their deposit base. In-
sured institutions on the brink of insolvency have every incentive to take
imprudent risks with funds rapidly obtained from deposit brokers on the
eve of insolvency; they have nothing to lose if such risks turn out badly
and everything to gain in the unlikely event that the imprudent risks turn
out well ex post. The deposit insurance system bears all of the costs asso-
ciated with the use of brokered deposits by insolvent, federally insured
banks. However, this moral hazard problem is not a result of brokered
deposits. Brokered deposits are merely a minor symptom of the disease,
which is the lack of risk-based deposit insurance, and a de facto policy of
resolving bank failures that extends the benefits of unlimited deposit in-
surance to all depositors in certain banks.
Eliminating brokered deposits will not impair the ability of large, so-
phisticated depositors to locate high-risk banks paying excessively high
rates of return on short-term certificates of deposit. Similarly, banks of-
fering high rates on CDs still could advertise their rates, and stock bro-
kers and other intermediaries still could provide information about high
rates on certificates of deposit to their customers. Depositors in search of
the highest available returns still will be able to shift their money from
bank to bank via wire transfer almost instantaneously. To solve the
moral hazard problems associated with the current regulatory scheme,
Congress will have to impose a truly risk-based pricing system for de-
posit insurance. Eliminating deposit insurance simply will result in a
trivial increase in the transaction costs associated with locating banks
52. FISCCA § 101(A)(1)B. FISCCA defines "deposit broker" as any person "engaged in the
business of placing deposits, or facilitating the placement of deposits, of third parties with insured
depository institutions, or the business of placing deposits with insured depository institutions for
the purpose of selling interests in those deposits to third parties."
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willing to pay high rates of return to depositors. And, since deposit bro-
kers are a valuable source of information for both depositors and regula-
tors about the financial condition of troubled banks, it is not clear that
the Treasury's proposal to restrict their activities will improve the safety
of the banking system even marginally. Instead, the most likely result of
the elimination of deposit brokers will be to increase the costs of expan-
sion for all banks. With the elimination of deposit brokers, banks that
want to compete for deposits nationally will have to advertise more and
incur the costs of obtaining national name recognition. Thus, absent de-
posit brokers, the costs of bank expansion will go up.
Finally, FISCCA does not repeal or even alter the provisions of the
Community Reinvestment Act which, as Walter Wriston has thought-
fully observed,53 actually mandates concentration in the banking indus-
try by insisting that banks allocate a disproportionate share of their
resources to their local community. Under the Community Reinvest-
ment Act, banks receive one of four ratings ("outstanding," "satisfac-
tory," "needs to improve," or "in substantial noncompliance") based on
how well they serve their local communities. Ironically, one conse-
quence of the Community Reinvestment Act is that a bank that locates
its offices exclusively in wealthy areas can obtain an outstanding rating
while doing little, if anything, to assist in the attainment of the Act's
ostensible purpose, which is to provide credit to low and moderate-in-
come neighborhoods. By contrast, banks that are located in poor areas,
and that attempt to diversify their loan portfolios by combining (risky)
loans within the community with (less risky) loans in other areas, may
find themselves in substantial noncompliance, particularly when local
community groups choose to challenge the lending decisions of the local
bank.
Thus, the Community Reinvestment Act penalizes banks that choose
to locate in poor areas. Even banks with outstanding Community Rein-
vestment Act ratings find it difficult to expand, either by merger or by
establishing new branches, because of opportunistic objections by interest
groups attempting to extract concessions from the expanding bank. In-
credibly, even banks that attempt to purchase insolvent banks may find
themselves subjected to challenges by special interest groups attempting
to wrangle promises of favorable action in exchange for agreements to
53. Wriston, No Wonder Banks Fail, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1990, at 16, col. 3.
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withdraw Community Reinvestment Act challenges.54 The opportunis-
tic protests launched by community interest groups are likely to stifle
banks' lending patterns in poor areas because banks will wait until they
need regulatory approval for a merger or similar transaction before mak-
ing commitments to poor areas. By waiting, the banks will appear to be
making concessions to such groups.
To reduce the regulatory burden on banks that wish to expand, the
Treasury should propose that the Community Reinvestment Act be
rethought to remove perverse incentives so that banks no longer would
be punished when they expanded from wealthy areas to poor ones or
from poor areas to wealthy ones.
2. Reforming Financial Services: Securities Powers
Title II of FISCCA would create two new sorts of holding companies,
Financial Services Holding Companies (FSHCs) and Diversified Holding
Companies (DHCs). A Financial Services Holding Company is any
company (other than a DHC) that controls a bank. Thus, existing bank
holding companies would, under the Treasury proposal, become FSHCs
on January 1, 1993. FISCCA prohibits banks from becoming FSHCs.55
Any bank that is currently a bank holding company by virtue of its con-
trol of another bank would be required to divest itself of its controlling
interest in the other bank or reorganize into a FSHC. In order to reor-
ganize into an FSHC, the bank would have to limit its activities to own-
ing and controlling banks.
Under FISCCA, a Diversified Holding Company is any company that
has control of a bank through an FSHC and that also engages in activi-
ties or controls companies engaged in activities that, under FISCCA,
FSHCs are forbidden to perform.
FISCCA would amend the Bank Holding Company Act so that
FSHCs can engage in any activity that is determined to be "of a financial
54. For example, a California community group known as the Greenlining Coalition lodged a
protest against Bank of America's proposed acquisition of Bank of New England until Bank of
America agreed to devote $5 billion to community lending over the next 10 years. Bank of America
has an "outstanding" CRA rating from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. In a similar
protest, the Bank of Boston's bid for Bank of New England has been challenged by the Massachu-
setts Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group, Inc. See Corman, Bank America's Huge CRA Pledge
Squelches New England Protest, Am. Banker, April 12, 1991, at 1, 10.
55. A statutory exception is made for foreign banks with FDIC insured branches. FISCCA
§ 202(a)(l)(B).
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nature. ' '5 6 Under present law, companies that control banks may only
engage in activities that are "so closely related to banking as to be a
proper incident thereto."5 7
FISCCA would amend the Glass-Steagall Act to allow any FSHC to
engage in a full range of securities activities, but such securities activities
could only be conducted through a separate subsidiary authorized by
FISCCA.58 These securities affiliates would be able to: (1) underwrite,
distribute, and deal in securities; (2) organize, control, and distribute
shares in investment companies registered under the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940; (3) engage in securities brokerage, private placement,
and investment advisory activities; and (4) engage in any other securities
activities permitted for brokers or dealers registered under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or permitted for investment advisers under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.11
Significantly, FISCCA would require any FSHC that acquires a secur-
ities affiliate to transfer all securities underwriting and securities dealing
activities from its bank's subsidiaries to its securities affiliate. The key to
understanding FISCCA's grant of new securities powers to financial
services firms is that the Act reduces rather than enlarges the ability of
banks to profit from dealing in securities and other non-traditional bank-
ing products. FISCCA permits new securities activities, to be sure, but
only through FSHCs, not through the banks themselves.
The Treasury proposal would amend section 16 of the Glass-Steagall
Act to provide that a national bank "may not engage in the United States
in any securities activity except to the extent such activity is specifically
authorized by statute or authorized by regulation, order or interpreta-
tion."'  Existing bank securities activities would be channeled to non-
banking affiliates. A number of activities currently permitted to banks
under existing law, including the purchase and sale of certain securities,
the purchase and sale of securities for customers in agency transactions,
the maintenance of collective investment funds, and the provision of in-
vestment advice and management for customers, would be removed from
56. FISCCA § 203(a)(3)A).
57. Bank Holding Company Act § 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988); National Courier
Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
58. FISCCA § 203(a)(3)(C).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 221.
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banks to the auspices of those banks' securities affiliates under the pro-
posed law.
The restrictions on banks' securities activities are bolstered by the es-
tablishment of stringent "firewalls" between FSHCs and DHCs.
FISCCA would prohibit any extension of credit "in any manner" by a
financial firm within an FSHC to a member of an affiliated FSHC group.
Thus, no bank or securities firm within an FSHC could extend credit to a
non-financial firm within the DHC.61
Our point here is that the provisions of FISCCA do nothing to pro-
mote bank safety. In all likelihood, they actually make banks more risky
by preventing them from attaining low-cost means to diversify their loan
portfolios through expansion into securities activities. FISCCA fails to
acknowledge that combining commercial banking and investment bank-
ing actually will reduce the riskiness associated with commercial banking
as long as the two activities can be combined in such a way that the
returns from each activity negatively correlate with one another. In
other words, a basic implication of portfolio theory is that the effect of an
activity (like dealing in securities) on the riskiness of a firm (like a com-
mercial bank) cannot be evaluated in the abstract, but rather must be
measured by looking at that activity along with the other activities con-
ducted by the firm.62 For example, "options are clearly riskier than their
underlying securities, but no one would suggest that purchasing a secur-
ity and its underlying put option increases the risk faced by the investor.
Rather, such a combination of investments, one risky and the other less
risky can clearly decrease or even eliminate risk."63 Thus, despite the
fact that investment banking is, in all probability, riskier than commer-
61. Id. § 204. These restrictions bolster the already strict restrictions on transactions between
banks and their affiliates contained in §§ 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251
(1913) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-l (1988)). Section 23A regulates transac-
tions between banks and their affiliates, including other firms owned or controlled by the same hold-
ing company as the bank. Section 23B requires that transactions between banks and their affiliates
be on terms that resemble an arm's length transaction, Le., on terms that are at least as favorable to
the bank as those prevailing at the time for comparable corporate transactions. FISCCA would
expand the scope of §§ 23A and 23B (see § 223), and would require that bank regulators be given
five days notice before extending credit to an affiliate, buying or investing in securities of the affiliate,
or purchasing any asset from the affiliate. Section 23A imposes strict limitations on these extensions
of credit. FISCCA also would expand the restriction of § 23A to include a bank's assumption of a
liability of an affiliate and any transaction to enhance the marketability of securities distributed by
the affiliate (unless there is substantial participation by other lenders in the transaction).
62. Macey, Marr & Young, The Glass-Steagall Act and the Riskiness of Financial In-
termediaries, forthcoming in J. OF REs. LAW & EcON. (1991) (copy on file with author).
63. Id. at 6-7.
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cial banking, the combination of investment banking and commercial
banking is likely to be less risky than commercial banking. The argu-
ment that permitting banks to engage in risky activities like selling insur-
ance or dealing in securities would increase bank risk ignores the fact
that the combination of these activities may enable banks to enjoy the
benefits of a portfolio effect. Portfolio effect is the reduction in total risk
from combining into a single portfolio a group of assets whose returns
are imperfectly correlated with each other.
Thus, by only granting new powers to Financial Service Holding Com-
panies, rather than to the banks controlled by such holding companies,
FISCCA prevents banks from obtaining the benefits associated with di-
versification into these other activities. All of the benefits of diversifica-
tion flow up from the bank to the FSHC. FISCCA should be amended
to permit banks themselves to take advantage of new powers, particularly
securities powers.
The potential benefits of granting banks new securities powers can be
explained as follows. One of the reasons commercial banks are in trouble
is because of the risks associated with the mismatch between the term
structure of their assets and liabilities. Specifically, banks' liabilities are
in the form of short-term obligations to depositors, while their assets con-
sist primarily of medium-term commercial loans. One reason for this
mismatch, of course, is customers' preferences. Depositors want ready
access to their cash, while borrowers need time to repay their obligations
to the bank.
One of the primary risks associated with this mismatch, between the
maturity structure of banks' assets and liabilities, concerns fluctuations in
the relationship between time to maturity and yield. The term "yield
curve" describes this relationship. On a yield curve, times to maturity
are arrayed along the x-axis, and yields themselves are arrayed along the
y-axis. Sometimes the yield curve will be ascending. When this is the
case, long-term assets such as bonds will yield more than short-term as-
sets. At other times, the yield curve will be descending, and short-term
assets (like commercial paper and certificates of deposit) will yield more
than long-term assets. When there is only a negligible difference between
the yield on long-term assets and the yield on short-term assets, the yield
curve is said to be flat. The yield curve will change in shape to reflect
changes in the market's estimation about inflation, long-term risk and
other macro-economic factors. Obviously, a commercial bank that must
rent capital on a short-term basis from depositors, while lending it on a
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relatively long-term basis, is quite vulnerable when the yield curve is de-
scending. A bank that can buy and sell a wide range of different types of
securities to the public can hedge the riskiness posed by fluctuations in
the yield curve. Thus, FISCCA, by forbidding banks to take advantage
of new powers, deprives banks of the ability to diversify the risks it faces
from fluctuations in the yield curve.
D. Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premiums
FISCCA requires the FDIC to impose a system of risk-based deposit
insurance assessments for all insured depository institutions." While a
system of risk-based deposit insurance is essential to any plan to reform
the banking industry, FISCCA's plan is fundamentally flawed. The flaw
lies in FISCCA's requirement that the FDIC use risk-based capital ratios
as a "fundamental basis" for establishing the categories of risk upon
which insurance premiums would be based. As noted above, risk-based
capital ratios do not provide a coherent basis for separating safe banks
from unsafe banks because of the crude distinctions made under such
capital ratios among various types of assets.
Instead of basing deposit insurance premiums on capital, the FDIC
should use market-based standards for setting deposit insurance premi-
ums. For example, as Stanford professor Kenneth Scott has suggested,
banks could be required to sell unsecured, uninsured subordinated de-
bentures in the capital markets.65 A bank's deposit insurance premium
could be set with reference to the interest rate set by the capital markets
on these debentures. Alternatively, premiums could be set by having
banks obtain co-insurance from private insurance companies. The rates
set by these private insurers could be used as a guide for the regulators.
Another option would require banks to obtain private insurance on a
portion of their deposits and federally funded insurance on the rest.
Again, the rates charged in the private sector could serve as a guide for
the rates charged by the FDIC.
Senator Alan Dixon has offered a proposal that contains a plan similar
to the one suggested here. Senator Dixon's proposed law would create a
re-insurance scheme for banks that are part of bank holding companies
with over $1 billion in assets, banks not part of bank holding companies
64. FISCCA § 104.
65. Scott, Deposit Insurance-The Appropriate Roles for State and Federal Governments, 53
BROOKLYN L. REv. 27, 35 (1987).
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with $1 billion in assets, and smaller banks that exercise insurance, secur-
ities, real estate, or investment powers either directly or through a hold-
ing company. The Dixon plan calls for the FDIC to sell between three
and ten percent of the risk associated with the failure of an insured bank
to private re-insurers or to a re-insurance subsidiary of a financial serv-
ices holding company. Under Senator Dixon's plan, covered banks
would negotiate with eligible re-insurers over rates, and the FDIC would
adjust the premium charged to the insured bank on the basis of the pre-
miums charged to the FDIC by the re-insurer. Senator Dixon's plan has
much to recommend it. It is not clear, however, why the proposal should
be limited to large banks, or why the additional options suggested here
for market-based pricing of deposit insurance should not be made avail-
able to covered banks.
Still another possibility would be to allow consortiums of banks to
enter into co-insurance schemes both as a way of reducing their own
insurance rates, and as a way of providing regulators with a market-
based bench-mark for fixing federal insurance premiums. News that a
particular bank could not gain entrance to a consortium, or was being
charged an unusually high premium or fee for entry into a co-insurance
group, would provide regulators with important new information.
For years the FDIC has been claiming that risk-based deposit insur-
ance is an impractical idea because bank regulators, including them-
selves, simply are incapable of segregating banks on the basis of risk. We
believe them. Their inability to predict reliably that a bank is going to
fail provides substantial support for their claim that they lack expertise.
That regulators have been unsuccessful at pricing deposit insurance on
the basis of risk does not mean that market-based pricing will not work.
Indeed the long-time failure of the regulatory system to impose market-
based pricing is a strong additional reason to move to a market-oriented
system.
Each of the specific proposals for risk-based deposit insurance sug-
gested above has advantages and disadvantages over the others. Some
would favor small banks over large banks. For example, a small bank
might find it easier to find private deposit insurance or willing co-insurers
than a large bank. Others would favor large banks over small banks. In
particular, small banks would be at a distinct disadvantage in trying to
create a market for its unsecured, subordinated debentures. Because of
the disparate impact these various proposals would have on different
banks, we propose that banks be given the option of selecting the insur-
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ance method they want most. Large banks might prefer to sell deben-
tures, while small banks might prefer to enter into co-insurance schemes.
Any of these alternatives would be preferable to the proposal contained
in FISCCA, since all of them are market-based, and none of them is
based on such unreliable indicators of risk as capital ratios.
IV. A FINAL WORD ON DEPOSIT INSURANCE
There has never been a convincing argument for federally sponsored
deposit insurance. The three most cogent arguments are: (1) deposit in-
surance is efficient because it solves a collective action problem that exists
among depositors; (2) deposit insurance is necessary to provide a "trans-
parent" payments system, one in which those accepting checks need only
worry about the credit-worthiness of the check writer, rather than about
financial institutions interposed between the check writer and the person
accepting the check as payment; and (3) society needs an institution in
which unsophisticated individuals can keep funds for safekeeping. We
will consider each of these arguments in turn.
A. Deposit Insurance and the Collective Action Problem Facing
Depositors
Commentators have argued that depositors face a collective action
problem, specifically a prisoner's dilemma, because all depositors realize
that the banks that maintain their deposits keep only a fraction of these
deposits on reserve at any given time. The rest of these funds are trans-
formed into relatively illiquid assets such as loans to home owners and
commercial clients. As a consequence of this mismatch between assets
and liabilities, all depositors cannot demand repayment of their deposits
simultaneously because the bank will not have sufficient funds on hand at
any given time to satisfy the demands of all depositors.66 Thus, if any
substantial portion of the bank's depositors withdraw their funds at the
same time, the bank will be forced to liquidate its assets "at distress
prices," rendering the bank insolvent and jeopardizing the interests of
those depositors who refrain from attempting to obtain immediate repay-
ment of their deposits from the bank. Thus, the argument goes:
[I]f some class of depositors does decide, for whatever reason, to withdraw
assets from the bank, other depositors will rationally conclude that they
66. Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73
VA. L. REv. 301, 307 (1987).
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must do the same to avoid being left with nothing. The result of such a
"run" on the bank's assets may be the failure of a previously solvent bank
to the detriment of depositors as a group.J67 The problem with this analy-
sis is that it ignores the ability of markets to solve this problem, at low cost,
through private contracts between banks and their depositors: The reason
the collective action problem is so acute in banking ... is because of the
asymmetry between the maturity structure of banking assets and the matur-
ity structure of banking liabilities. But there is nothing preventing banks
from designing their asset portfolios to match their liabilities by purchasing
highly liquid short-term assets. This would eliminate the collective action
problem facing depositors in ways similar to deposit insurance. Thus, the
design of deposit insurance makes it possible for banks to have a disparity
between the maturity structure of their assets and liabilities. Absent such a
design, rational depositors would prefer to place their deposits at banks that
matched the maturity structure of bank assets with those of bank
liabilities. 68
In particular, in a world without deposit insurance, banks, in order to
attract depositors and stay in business, would have an incentive to design
contractual solutions to this perceived collective action problem. On the
asset side of the balance sheet, banks could agree to keep their assets in
short-term money market instruments or in other highly liquid, short-
term assets. Banks willing to make this commitment would be able to
attract deposits at lower interest rates than other banks.
On the liability side of the balance sheet, banks could mitigate the col-
lective action problem by issuing certificates of deposit with longer matu-
rities. Those depositors willing to accept certificates of deposit with
longer maturities would be able to command higher interest payments
from their banks. Similarly, in exchange for higher interest on their de-
posit accounts, depositors might agree to forego the right to repayment
on demand, and to give the banks holding their funds the option of delay-
ing payment for a few days or weeks where necessary. This would elimi-
nate the necessity of a bank having to liquidate assets under duress to
meet unexpected liquidity demands by depositors. Thus, it seems clear
that existing contractual devices provide sufficient means for depositors
to protect themselves from the prisoner's dilemma posed by a fractional
reserve banking system.
67. Id. at 308.
68. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 OHIO ST. L. REv. 1277, 1281
(1989).
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B. Deposit Insurance and the Payments System
The second argument in favor of governmentally supplied deposit in-
surance is that such insurance is necessary to provide a payments system
that allows those accepting checks to worry only about the credit-worthi-
ness of the check-writer and to ignore the credit-worthiness of the finan-
cial institutions between the check writer and the person accepting the
check as payment. This argument has merit. In a complex economy
with many financial institutions, the transaction costs of doing business
would be prohibitive if there were a realistic danger that the payments
system would collapse at any moment. But this is not an argument for
deposit insurance, it is an argument for a central bank that can monitor
and guarantee the integrity of the banks within the payments system.
The existence of deposit insurance is wholly superfluous to a properly
functioning payments system. Clear evidence of this is the proliferation
of uninsured money-market funds with check-writing privileges. Inves-
tors who keep funds in these accounts have absolutely no trouble having
their drafts accepted for payment in the same way that checks are ac-
cepted. The Federal Reserve Board's ability to supervise, monitor, and,
if necessary, guarantee the payments system provide all of the safeguards
necessary to protect the financial integrity of the payments system. De-
posit insurance adds nothing to the functions performed by the central
bank.
C. Deposit Insurance and the Need to Protect Small Savers
The final argument in favor of deposit insurance is that small savers
need deposit insurance because they have neither the resources nor the
sophistication to evaluate the riskiness of the financial intermediaries that
they entrust with their savings. This argument is also flawed. In a world
without federal deposit insurance, small depositors desiring extra protec-
tion of their funds would be able to purchase such protection from pri-
vate insurers. Moreover, the small depositor argument ignores banks'
strong incentive to attract such small depositors and to make credible
(bonded) promises that such depositors' funds will be kept safe. In addi-
tion to private insurance, banks could promise to keep depositor funds in
U.S. government guaranteed securities, or to back the bank's financial
obligations to depositors on the basis of the personal liability of the
bank's shareholders.
Obviously, depositors would have to pay for the extraordinary levels of
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protection described above. But it is important to remember that the
argument in favor of federal deposit insurance is that small depositors
demand absolute safety. If this is not true, the last argument in favor of
federal deposit insurance disappears.
In fact, the general public does not benefit very much, if at all, from
deposit insurance:
Contrary to popular belief, the primary beneficiary of deposit insurance
appears to be the insured banks themselves rather than the depositors. This
argument becomes almost self-evident when one observes that even during
the incredible four-year period from 1930-1933 when 9000 banks failed or
suspended operation, losses to depositors came to only 1.3 billion dollars as
compared to losses of 85 billion dollars suffered by holders of common and
preferred stock.69
Thus, none of the public-interest justifications for deposit insurance
appear valid. Nonetheless, while FISCCA retains federally backed de-
posit insurance, it also makes no meaningful reforms to the way in which
the insurance system is administered. We would recommend privatizing
deposit insurance along the lines described above, or, at the very least,
linking the price of federally backed insurance to market-based criteria.
CONCLUSION
Observing the traumatic shocks that have been felt by the banking in-
dustry in the U.S. should help Americans understand the problems asso-
ciated with deregulating industries that previously enjoyed the solicitous
protections of government regulators. The shocks to the banking indus-
try provide a glimpse of what citizens in eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union are seeing on an economy-wide basis.
While the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry came about as the
result of governmental policies aimed at helping consumers, the deregu-
lation of banking is occurring in spite of the best efforts of regulators,
governmental officials, and industry participants. Deregulation of bank-
ing, like the deregulation and privatization in eastern Europe, is being
brought about by the inability of a hopelessly inefficient, highly
bureaucratized industry to survive in global and domestic markets
against more agile, less regulated competition.
The Treasury Department is entirely correct in its observation that the
problems faced by American banks are a result of the antiquated regula-
69. Id. at 1283.
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tory structure that simultaneously rewards recklessly managed banks for
excessive risk-taking, while punishing well-run banks for prudence. Un-
fortunately, the reforms contained in the Treasury's plan do not go
nearly far enough to relieve the banking system of the regulatory con-
straints that precipitated the current crisis.
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